We refer the reader to our JACM 2016 journal paper [KS] and summarize its approach here: the general strategy in this paper is to run a Ben-Or type algorithm (as improved by Bracha) in which either processors decide on a value and come to agreement, or processors simulate a global coin using independent random coins. We show that with constant probability there is large "good" deviation by the good coinflips (in the "good" direction) and when this occurs, if there is no decision, there must be "bad" deviation caused by the adversarially-controlled (bad) processors which counterbalance this deviation (in the "bad" direction). Eventually, the deviation by bad processors becomes unusually frequent and detectable, so that good processor will eventually exclude these from their calculations in future global coin simulations.
Corrections in Section 5
Insert the following Fact 3 in Section 5.1.
Fact 3: Let M n be the maximum value of a symmetric, 1-dimensional random walk after n steps and let S n be the value of the random walk at step n. For a symmetric ran-dom walk, for any r >= 1, P r(M n ≥ r) = P r(S n = r) + 2P r(S n > r), which implies P r(M n ≥ r) < 2P r(S n ≥ r). (See page 4 of [Z] )
In the JACM paper, we identified two sources of bad deviation other than that caused by coinflips from bad processors: (1) coinflips from ≤ t good processors which have been excluded because they are thought to be bad which sum to ≤ β/2, (2) t deviation caused by a total of t "ambiguous" coins (from the asynchrony). Now we add (3), the effect of the adversary possibly cutting short the number of coinflips, We change β/2 to β/4 for each of the coinflips of type (1) and type (3) and modify Lemma 5.2 to account for these effects.
Lemma 5.2. (1) A stream of between 1 and nt coin flips which can be stopped adversarially anywhere in this range has deviation exceeding β/4 = 2n(n − t)/4 − t/2 with probability at most (1/2)e −(β/4) 2 /2nt. If t < .005n, then this probability is at most e −11 .
(2) A stream of between n(n−2t) and n(n−t) coin flips which can be stopped adversarially anywhere in this range has deviation of at least α ′ = 2n(n − 2t) − β/4 in any specified direction with probability exceeding 1/20.
Proof (1) Consider a random walk of nt steps, starting at the origin, where each step is equally likely to be 1 or -1. By Fact 3, the probability that its maximum value is at least β/4 is no more than twice the probability that the sum of nt coin flips is at least β/4, which is at most 2e −(β/4) 2 /2tn (by Lemma 5.2 old). If t < .005n, then this probability is at most e −11 .
(2) The stream consists of the first n(n − 2t) good coins plus a stream which the adversary can stop at any point afterwords. By Lemma 5.1, the first part of the stream has deviation α with probability greater than .211. The second part of the stream can, in the worst case, be adjusted by the adversary to the maximum deviation achieved which equals or exceeds β/4 (in the opposite direction) with probability at most e −11 . The probability that the entire stream has deviation at least α ′ is at least the probability that the first event occurs and the second doesn't. Hence the probability that the entire stream has deviation α ′ is at least .211 − e −11 > 1/20. In Lemma 5.5, Change t < n/36 to t < 1/72.
Corrections for Variant 1
For Variant 1: Let H be the matrix filled by a stream of independent, random −1, 1 coinflips except in up to t adversarially chosen columns. In these columns, the adversary picks points to stop the stream as it is filling a column, and the rest of the column (the suffix) is filled with 0's.
Then H = H ′ + W where H ′ is a matrix of −1, 1 independent, random coin flips, and W is all 0's except the suffixes in columns changed by the adversary, where its entries are the negation of the columns of H ′ . Now change the definition of G as follows, in the middle of page 15, second paragraph after Theorem 6.1. All entries of G in columns controlled by bad processors are set to 0.
For j corresponding to a good processor, the (i, j) entry of G is the sum of the j-th column for the matrix H generated in iteration i of Algorithm 5.
Note that G = R + Z, where R is a matrix where every entry in each good column is set to the sum of n fair coinflips, and every entry in each bad column is set to 0. Additionally, Z is a matrix where the (i, j) entry is the sum of the j-th column of the matrix W generated in iteration i of Algorithm 5.
By a property of norms, |G| ≤ |R| + |Z|. Hence, P r(|G| > a) ≤ P r(|R| + |Z| > a) ≤ P r(|(R| > a/2) + P r(|Z| > a/2), where the last step holds by a union bound. P r(|R| > a/2) is bounded by Theorem 6.1 as explained in the paper. P r(|Z| > a/2) is bounded by Theorem 6.1 as well. Note that Z is a matrix of independent random variables some of which are set to 0 and some of which are distributed as the sum of a number of coinflips between 1 and n. The number is set adversarially but this does not affect the analysis.
Applying Corollary 6.2 to both Z and R, we have P r(|G| > (6 + 2ǫ) n(m + n)) < 2(m + n) −1 .
In Lemmas 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, and their proofs, replace the expression 3 + ǫ with 6 + 2ǫ, and the expression 4 + ǫ with 7 + 2ǫ. In proof of Lemma 6.7, replace 1/(m + n) by 2/(m + n) each time it appears. In statement of Lemma 6.7 and Theorem 1.1, replace t < 4.25 * 10 −7 n by t < 3.3 * 10 −8 n.
In the paragraph before Lemma 6.4, replace "When t < n/36, β/2 > 23n/36" with "When t < 10 −6 n, (β/2) 2 > .49999n 2 " and replace the sentence "Then this inequality holds..." with "Then this inequality holds when t < c 1 n(.183 2 )β 2 6(7+2ǫ) 2 n 2 , which requires t < (2/3)(.001)(.0183) 2 (.49999) 2 (7 + 2ǫ) −2 n ≤ 1.14 * 10 −9 n.
